On January 26, 2026, the US Air Forces Central (AFCENT), which are under the command of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), announced the conduct of military exercises aimed at improving the US ability to deploy and disperse its air forces, as well as to support combat aviation operations in the Middle East.
The start of the AFCENT exercises coincided with the deployment of US troops in the waters around Iran. On the day of the announcement of the start of the Central Air Forces training, the American aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, along with the destroyers USS Frank E. Petersen, Jr., USS Spruance, and USS Michael Murphy, arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
This carrier group became the first to be deployed to the Middle East since the departure of the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz from the Middle Eastern region in September 2025.
The Davos agreements of the Trump administration with the leaders of the Arabian Peninsula countries solidified the previous compromise, under which Washington refrains from launching a large ground or prolonged air campaign against Iran, while regional states join the Council of Peace and form the first budget for its program.
The current buildup of US naval and air presence is a mechanism of coercion to negotiations, which preserves strategic initiative for Washington and at the same time leaves room for partners to avoid direct complicity in a large-scale war.
The ayatollah regime’s reaction to the increase in US military presence in the Middle East was Tehran’s preparation of exercises for its own armed forces.
On January 29, 2026, the Navy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced the conduct of live-fire exercises from February 1-2 in the Strait of Hormuz—the logistical route between Iran and the UAE, through which about 20% of global liquefied natural gas trade and 1/5 of global oil consumption is transported.
Despite the accumulation of armed forces and the conduct of exercises in the region, the American administration continues to deliberately avoid escalation that would go beyond controlled developments.
On February 1, 2026, Donald Trump stated that meaningful negotiations are being conducted with Tehran and expressed expectations that the current stage of agreements could lead to the conclusion of a nuclear deal.
By emphasizing in this statement the fact of directing ships to the Persian Gulf, the US President confirms Washington’s strategic advantages in subsequent stages of confrontation with the ayatollah regime.
He also affirms the White House’s ability to dictate the time, method, intensity, and directions of further confrontation with the authoritarian axis in the Middle East.
At the same time, the American administration takes into account that the US refusal from the force phase of the operation against Iran without obtaining concrete results in dismantling its nuclear program during the negotiation process will give the ayatollah regime additional time.
This time could be used to restore internal political stability and regain the ability to support autocratic proxy forces outside Iran.
Moreover, the absence of a US response to Tehran’s stalling of agreements could lead to the successful implementation of the ayatollah regime’s nuclear program.
Taking into account the short-term nature of the “window of opportunity” for depriving Iran of its nuclear infrastructure, the American administration simultaneously determines that an operation directed against the ayatollah regime should not turn into a long-term armed conflict.
Such a conflict would have an uncontrolled course, unpredictable consequences, and large-scale financial and military losses.
Both Washington and the regional political dynamics opposing the axis of autocracies perceive potential chaos in a state with significant potential for creating weapons of mass destruction as a risk to the stability of the entire Middle East for a significant period of time.
Washington’s logic is gradually shifting from a one-time strike to the phased demilitarization of Iran as a system of coercion.
After the degradation of nuclear infrastructure and the limitation of space for further uranium enrichment, the next node becomes the IRGC fleet, which ensures the regime’s ability to shift the crisis into a mode of global economic damage through the Strait of Hormuz.
Next in this sequence is the removal of Iranian air deterrence capabilities, including the air force component and layered air defense, which forms the regime’s ultimate vulnerability to any larger-scale dismantling scenario.
Such a sequence simultaneously limits the risk of uncontrolled regional collapse and increases the cost of further resistance for Tehran at each subsequent stage.
At the same time, such security precautions prompt Middle Eastern centers of power and the US to form different strategies for further actions regarding the ayatollah regime.
The Gulf monarchies, as well as other states in the Middle East, based on their own considerations of regional stability and safeguarding their countries from the consequences of a new wave of confrontation between Washington and Tehran, seek to fix the negotiation format as the priority channel for settling the US-Iranian confrontation.
During the second half of January 2026, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty held telephone conversations with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy Steve Witcoff, which did not lead to any progress.
Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed to the presidents of the US and Iran to hold a teleconference mediated by Ankara, but interest in such an initiative was expressed only by Donald Trump.
Despite the fact that on January 30, 2026, the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry visited Istanbul and met with his Turkish counterpart and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abbas Araghchi reiterated the previous position of Iran’s leadership, stating the ayatollah regime’s lack of plans to engage in dialogue with US officials and emphasizing that Tehran is ready for armed escalation.
At the same time, key Gulf monarchies demonstrated that to prevent military confrontation, they are capable of revising the unspoken rules of their security cooperation with the US in the region.
Consistent contacts of regional capitals with Iran’s leadership and public guarantees of refusal to provide airspace, territory, or infrastructure for an American operation form the framework of a precisely limited force scenario.
For Washington and its partners, the optimal compromise becomes not the dismantling of the regime in the first phase, but the neutralization of key elements of Iran’s naval potential, primarily the IRGC forces in the Strait of Hormuz area, to structurally reduce Tehran’s ability to blockade the sea corridor and blackmail global energy markets.
In such a construct, the US retains the right to use force and demonstrates control of escalation, while the Gulf monarchies minimize the risk of retaliatory strikes on their own critical infrastructure and reduce Iran’s motivation to attack them as accomplices.
On January 27, 2026, during a telephone conversation with the President of Iran, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated that the Kingdom would not allow the use of its airspace and territory for armed operations against Tehran.
A similar statement was made by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which also assured Tehran of the United Arab Emirates’ refusal to provide logistical support for potential Washington actions.
The position and rhetoric of the Arabian and Emirati governments are due to the fact that both monarchies define as a priority the reduction of their own vulnerability and the protection of their countries’ critical infrastructure.
After the start of the Twelve-Day Iran-Israel War and the US Armed Forces’ strikes on the ayatollah regime’s nuclear facilities, representatives of Iranian authorities made threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which the main part of Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s oil and gas exports occurs.
By refusing to support US military actions, the Gulf monarchies seek to minimize the risks of closing the transport corridor, through which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia exports 5.5 million barrels of crude oil and gas condensate per day, and the United Arab Emirates—more than 1.5 million barrels daily.
An additional factor restraining the Middle Eastern monarchies from a tougher position in the US-Iranian confrontation is the location of these countries’ fuel facilities within the range of Iranian armaments and Tehran’s readiness to use strikes on them as a tool of pressure on the Gulf countries.
Iran’s proxy forces have already resorted to such operations. In 2019, the ayatollah regime involved Yemeni Houthis in attacks on a Saudi oil processing plant near the city of Abqaiq and the Khurais oil field, which temporarily caused more than a twofold reduction in oil production in the Kingdom and a 2.3% drop in the Saudi stock market.
The course chosen by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, gave Tehran a signal about the unreadiness of the Arab regional political dynamics to be involved in a potential US operation against Iran.
At the same time, such a position of the Arabian states strengthened Washington’s distrust of the Gulf monarchies in matters of countering Tehran—thus, Donald Trump stated that the White House is not ready to disclose details of its military planning to Arab allies.
As a result, the tactic chosen by the Arabian monarchies complicated for Washington the formation of a broad coalition and increased the risk of collapse of the architecture of containing the autocratic axis in the Middle East, in which Iran is the central node.
The distancing of Islamic dynamic countries from White House initiatives demonstrated that readiness for direct involvement in a force scenario of containing Iran is preserved only by Israel.
On January 24, 2026, amid the escalation of the US-Iranian confrontation, CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper visited Tel Aviv and met with the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, as well as the heads of the Israeli army’s Intelligence Directorate and Operations Directorate.
Despite the fact that the military leadership of both countries did not disclose the topic of the meeting, such interaction became evidence of coordination of Washington and Jerusalem’s strategies in the region, and also laid the foundation for coordinating actions in the event of further escalation of the conflict with Iran.
Since for most other centers of power in the Middle East, confrontation with Tehran is a source of danger that outweighs the potential benefits of demonstrating solidarity with the US, as a result of the escalation of the US-Iranian confrontation, Washington risks being limited to the framework of bilateral interaction with Israel.
The Israeli-American coalition against Iran has already been tested during the military campaign of June 2025 and proved insufficient to achieve results capable of causing the transformation of the Iranian regime, or at least putting Tehran before the need to conclude a new nuclear deal.
The high intensity of strikes and technological superiority of the US and Israel over Iran allow for significant damage to the ayatollah regime’s military infrastructure and nuclear facilities, but they do not create conditions that will prompt Iran to revise its expansionist ambitions in the region.
The absence of broader coalition support for Washington’s actions transforms the force pressure on the ayatollah regime into a series of limited operations incapable of achieving the desired result for the Trump administration.
The lack of sufficient regional support for systemic, comprehensive, and strategic pressure on Tehran has formed in the White House an understanding of the need to engage a regional partner whose role can make further confrontation for Iran significantly more costly and dangerous.
Given Turkey’s military potential, its geographical position, and its ability to coordinate around itself part of the Islamic dynamic states, the White House views Ankara as such an additional element of containing Iran.
At the same time, active engagement of Turkey in the process of containing Tehran requires the US to revise its approaches to interaction with the Erdogan government.
The White House takes into account that Ankara will resort to deepening coordination with Washington strictly under conditions of recognition of its key influence on regions that the Turkish political dynamics considers as zones of its priority interests.
One of such territories and a key point of intersection of regional interests between Turkey and Israel is Syria—a country where the US possesses real levers for correcting the regional balance of influence.
It is the Syrian contour of Middle Eastern policy that became the point where the Trump administration made concessions to Ankara, viewing them as part of a strategic compromise to strengthen the containment of Iran.
The main element of correcting American policy in interaction with the Erdogan government was the revision of approaches to the Kurdish issue in Syria.
From the beginning of the civil war on Syrian territory, the US and Israel viewed Kurdish and Druze communities as local allies and forces through which Washington and Jerusalem were able to counter the Shia “axis of resistance” and Turkey-oriented military-political organizations.
At the same time, the Kurdish autonomy formed in northeastern Syria was viewed by Ankara as a security threat located along the Turkish-Syrian border and a systemic political challenge.
The existence of an autonomous Kurdish region created a dangerous precedent for Ankara that fueled separatist sentiments among Turkey’s Kurdish population.
In parallel, according to Ankara’s statements, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), banned in Turkey, used Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria as a base for locating its fighters and storing weapons.
Since 2015, Turkey and Syrian rebels loyal to it have consistently attempted to liquidate the Kurdish autonomous enclave. To achieve this goal, during 2016-2019, the Turkish Armed Forces conducted operations “Euphrates Shield,” “Olive Branch,” and “Peace Spring,” as a result of which Turkish troops managed to create a buffer zone on the Turkish-Syrian border and take control of separate Kurdish districts.
Political and security threats to Ankara were further complicated by the fact that as of January 2026, Kurdish structures controlled areas with key Syrian fuel resources, including the Omar oil field and the Conoco gas field in Deir ez-Zor province.
Thus, the return of Syrian Kurdistan under the control of the Ankara-loyal government of Ahmed al-Sharaa meant the simultaneous narrowing of opportunities for cross-border Kurdish mobilization and the loss by al-Sharaa’s main political opponents of the resource base that strengthened the self-sufficiency of the Kurdish entity.
At the moment of escalation of the US-Iranian confrontation in January 2026, the issue of further US support for the Kurds became the main indicator of how much the White House is ready to take into account Ankara’s priorities in regional policy.
The updated US position on the Syrian conflict, which recognized Turkey and the Ankara-allied government in Damascus as having priority right to determine Syria’s political future, was demonstrated during the Syrian armed forces’ offensive on Kurdish areas.
After the start of the Syrian government’s operation in the Kurdish-controlled part of the country, Washington deliberately refrained from political and military intervention to protect Kurdish autonomy.
On January 20, 2025, the US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack publicly stated that the role of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as the main force countering radical Islamist groups in Syria is exhausted, and their preservation as a separate center of influence is no longer part of US priorities.
This statement was preceded by a series of steps by the Trump administration that legitimized the new power in Syria and initiated the process of restoring political contacts between Washington and Damascus.
In the summer of 2025, after Donald Trump signed an executive order lifting a series of financial restrictions against Damascus, barriers to the return of Western capital to the country were unblocked.
In November 2025, the UN Security Council voted for a Washington-initiated resolution that lifted sanctions against representatives of Syria’s new political leadership.
On November 10, 2025, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa visited Washington and met with Donald Trump, thus making the first visit in history by a Syrian leader to the White House.
The political stabilization between Washington and Damascus was marked by readiness to define the al-Sharaa government as the main center for countering Islamist terrorism in the country.
At the end of 2025, the Republican administration and the new Syrian government agreed on the country’s cooperation with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
Such a complex of steps, which consistently legitimized the post-Assad leadership of Syria, demonstrated the absence of significant objections from Washington regarding the integration of Kurdish territories into the renewed Syrian state vertical.
After the completion of the government forces’ offensive and the conclusion of agreements between Damascus and the SDF, which provided for the de facto integration of Kurdish administrative and military structures into the corresponding Syrian institutions, a new phase emerged.
In this context, the US returned to implementing plans for a gradual reduction of its military presence in Syria.
Washington’s announcement of its disinterest in maintaining an armed contingent in the country finally consolidated the change in the US approach.
The White House is now working on the prospect of creating a broader situational regional alliance against Tehran, within which the role of Kurdish formations is revised taking into account the need to deepen coordination with Ankara and reduce tensions in US-Turkish relations.
Washington’s consent to the dismantling of Kurdish autonomy as an independent center of power in favor of normalizing relations with Turkey became one of the most significant concessions from the US to the Erdogan government in recent years.
The Trump administration’s calculation is that such a correction of American Middle Eastern policy lays the foundation for a significant increase in Ankara’s loyalty in the broader confrontation with the autocratic axis in the region, the main channel for spreading influence of which is Iran.
Washington’s key goal in the Middle East is now to form a political environment in which Ankara’s position does not contradict American initiatives regarding the ayatollah regime.
Moreover, the White House expects that under favorable conditions, Turkey will form an additional direction of pressure on Iran’s northwestern borders, where the ayatollah regime will be forced to redeploy part of Iranian troops.
Despite Ankara’s official assurances of its interest in the stability of Iran’s internal political situation, the Erdogan government considers the creation of a potential “buffer zone” on the Iranian side of the common border with Turkey, which de facto will turn this territory into a sphere of Ankara’s direct influence amid the destabilization of the ayatollah regime.
In addition to Turkey’s external pressure, which will create conditions for the fragmentation of Tehran’s military resources, Ankara is capable of activating instruments of influence within Iranian society.
The Iranian provinces bordering Turkey have an ethnic structure different from the majority of the country, as Azerbaijanis—a people of Turkic origin—predominate there in number.
These communities traditionally demonstrate disloyalty both to the ayatollah regime and to the pro-Persian nationalist part of the Iranian opposition, while maintaining a distinct sympathy for Azerbaijan, which has long-term partnership relations with Turkey.
Taking into account the ethnic factor and Ankara’s potential interest in strengthening its influence on the southwestern part of Iran, Washington made an additional concession to the Erdogan government by abandoning reliance on Reza Pahlavi as a potential leader of Iran’s revisionist identity.
By resorting to concessions to Ankara in order to create a US-Turkish alliance against Tehran that is relevant under current conditions, the White House incorporates into its calculations the limited predictability of the Erdogan government’s foreign policy in the long term.
The strategy of the Turkish leadership is consistently based on pragmatic maximization of benefits from parallel interaction with several centers of power without clear and long-term commitments to any of them.
Thus, the presence of joint energy projects with Russia, Turkey’s submission of an application to join BRICS, and the country’s long-term partnership with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization did not become a restraining factor for Ankara in December 2024.
In that month, as a result of the offensive by the Turkey-supported Syrian opposition, the Assad regime collapsed, and the Erdogan government became the main political beneficiary of the change of power in Syria.
Due to such situational nature of Ankara’s foreign policy decisions, the US does not build its Middle Eastern strategy through deepening partnership solely with the Turkish political dynamics.
In parallel with attempts to engage Turkey in countering Iran, Washington maintains stable channels of cooperation with Ankara’s regional competitor—Israel, develops mutually beneficial relations with Arab monarchies, and avoids a strategy in which the effectiveness of American containment of Iran significantly depends on Ankara’s position.
The current rapprochement between the US and Turkey has a distinctly situational character and is conditioned by the Gulf monarchies’ unreadiness to participate in direct pressure on the ayatollah regime.
At the same time, in the longer term, Washington expects to preserve variability of actions, working relations with all regional opponents of the autocratic axis, and does not plan to fix its Middle Eastern strategy on one partner.
After the de-escalation of confrontation with Iran, American policy in the region will again return to balancing between Turkish and Arab political dynamics, taking into account the role and interests of Israel.
This approach allows the US to adapt its actions in the Middle East according to changes in the balance of power between regional centers, without concentrating its strategy on any one of them.
