On January 7, 2026, the Balkan bureau of Radio Free Europe published an investigation based on non-public customs data, according to which the PRC significantly increased arms supplies to Serbia in the period from January 2024 to June 2025, with a total value of up to $280 million.
Although the Serbian government concealed the nomenclature of purchases, the investigation emphasizes that the funds were directed toward acquiring unmanned systems, air defense assets, and new military equipment.
In particular, it is believed that in mid-2025, the PRC may have delivered to Serbia the long-range anti-aircraft missile system HQ-9—one of the most technologically advanced Chinese air defense systems.
At the same time, transit may have been carried out through Egyptian airbases—another operator of the HQ-9, which in December 2025 deployed this system on the border with Israel.
The public exposure of practical military-industrial cooperation between the PRC and Serbia occurred after their first-ever joint exercises, Peace Guardian 2025, in Hebei Province (July 18-28).
Those maneuvers were aimed at practicing combat operations in urban and rural areas in conditions of mountainous terrain similar to the Balkan theater, with extensive involvement of unmanned systems.
In a broader context, the transfer of new Chinese weapons for Belgrade’s needs confirmed the relevance of the agreement between Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Xi Jinping on expanding military-technical cooperation, reached during the military parade in Beijing on September 3, 2025.
This process is unfolding against the backdrop of the United States’ attempts to intercept control over the political dynamics of the Balkans and Eastern Europe as a whole.
In the spring of 2025, Donald Trump delegated his son Donald Trump Jr. to Serbia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to persuade their governments to curtail strategic ties with the PRC—primarily infrastructure-investment, financial, and trade.
These steps fit into the American campaign to block the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative and the US aspiration to transform the Eastern European space into a “new Southeast Asia”—a competitive industrial hub to the PRC with minimal labor costs within the Euro-Atlantic area.
At the same time, while Romania and partially Bulgaria accepted an agenda favorable to the White House, Hungary and Serbia maintained their attachment to Beijing’s geopolitical orbit.
After a series of unsuccessful attempts to force Budapest and Belgrade to revise their pro-Chinese course, the Donald Trump administration expects to adjust its regional strategy taking into account the results of the Hungarian parliamentary elections in the spring of 2026.
From the American perspective, it is precisely these that should become the starting point for further pressure on the Serbian government, which is critically linked to Budapest.
The mentioned situation has deep roots. At least since 2014, Serbia has played a key role in Xi Jinping’s European strategy.
In particular, Beijing views it as a central link in the Belt and Road Initiative (within the Piraeus-Belgrade-Budapest route; the “Danube Corridor” from the Black Sea delta to Germany), as well as a state capable of undermining the stability of the Balkan and broader Eastern European region.
After the partial loss of Russian influence on the Balkans in 2022—primarily due to EU sanctions—the PRC intercepted influence on Serbia and neighboring pro-autocratic regimes, providing them with economic, financial, military, and diplomatic support.
If until 2026 Serbia was viewed by Xi Jinping as one of the strategic proxies for undermining US interests in Europe, now its significance is substantially increasing due to the change in political conjuncture.
First, the PRC is increasingly concerned about the possibility of victory in the parliamentary elections in Hungary in April 2026 by the Tisza Party—a new opportunistic political force that, according to sociological polls, leads the Fidesz of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán by almost 8%.
In the event of forming a government led by the Tisza leader (Péter Magyar), Budapest will abandon strategic interaction with the PRC in favor of easing confrontation with the EU and seeking a “grand bargain” with Donald Trump.
Second, Beijing is deeply concerned about forecasts for parliamentary elections in Slovakia, scheduled for 2027. According to polls, the leader of the race is consistently Progressive Slovakia—a liberal, pro-American force that openly opposes Chinese expansion.
At the same time, the PRC has suffered a strategic weakening of positions due to Donald Trump’s interception of decisive influence in Greece—until recently the key “gateway” of the Belt and Road Initiative to Europe.
This is confirmed both by the deepening of US participation in the development of Greek logistics infrastructure and Washington’s involvement in the deployment of the Achilles Shield defense program, as well as by the unsuccessful trips of high-ranking representatives of the Communist Party of China to Athens to promote further investments in the Greek port network.
Collectively, these factors form a situation in which the PRC risks losing most proxy regimes within the EU by 2027; instead, regional influence will be strengthened in favor of the US for the first time since 2014.
This scenario is realized by the Donald Trump administration, which consistently seeks to deprive the PRC of access to its own proxy regimes in the global dimension—including in Syria, Venezuela, and Iran.
Under such conjuncture, Serbia emerges for Beijing as the most important proxy jurisdiction in Eastern Europe (outside the context of China’s absorption of the RF), distinguished by a stable pro-autocratic course and low sensitivity to external political pressure.
From the Chinese perspective, this advantage was confirmed by the ineffectiveness of mass anti-government protests in 2024-2025, caused by the collapse of Belt and Road Initiative objects in Novi Sad; this disaster led to the death of 16 people.
In particular, the administration of President Vučić limited itself to several resignations of officials, refocusing on demonizing civil society and their “Western donors.”
At the same time, on December 24, 2025, the High Court of Novi Sad ruled on the innocence of former Infrastructure Minister Goran Vesić—the key negotiator with the PRC on the deployment of the Belt and Road Initiative network—in the mentioned disaster due to “lack of evidence”; a similar decision applied to the rest of the executors of the Chinese project.
Ultimately, Xi Jinping expressed satisfaction with the preservation of power by President Aleksandar Vučić and the stable level of public support for the Serbian Progressive Party, which as of the end of 2025 maintained about 50% electoral ratings.
In practical terms, this means that the next general elections in Serbia in 2027 are highly likely to end in favor of political forces loyal to the PRC—even under the condition of a formal replacement of President Vučić due to the completion of his second term. Accordingly, this is about a Chinese strategic asset.
The Donald Trump administration takes into account these degradation processes, essentially curtailing attempts to intercept influence on Belgrade.
A key manifestation of this was the December decision by Jared Kushner—son-in-law and confidant of Donald Trump—to abandon the implementation of the Trump Tower Belgrade hotel complex project on the site of the former Yugoslav army headquarters—a national symbol of the “1999 NATO bombings.” The total cost of the project was estimated at $880 million.
Despite Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić publicly expressing dissatisfaction with the deal’s disruption, formally referring to the Serbian prosecutor’s decision to arrest officials responsible for transferring the monument under US control, this step evidently reflected Beijing’s political will.
Notably, in this context, it is about both geopolitical and narrative dimensions, in which a central place is occupied by the exploitation of the theme of “NATO crimes in Serbia” as a tool for strategic containment of American presence.
At the same time, the White House maintained for Serbia the highest tariff restrictions in Europe—35%. In parallel, 30% tariffs were kept in force regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, a significant part of whose political space is under the influence of the pro-separatist Republika Srpska.
The imposition of such tariffs against Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina—states with preferential customs regimes in trade with the EU—indicates their perception by Washington as transit proxy jurisdictions for Chinese goods—according to logic similar to fronting practices in Southeast Asia.
Collectively, this demonstrates the US readiness to fix a negative status quo with the possibility of transitioning from a containment policy to punitive, rather than incentive, instruments of influence.
Regarding the prospect of American support for protest forces, it faces two key limitations: the White House’s unwillingness to openly advocate for pro-liberal opposition movements and the low ability of demonstrators to actually influence Serbia’s political conjuncture.
Because of this, the Donald Trump administration hopes that the corresponding steps will be implemented by European democracies, in particular through blocking Belgrade’s negotiations on EU accession.
A manifestation of the latter was President Vučić’s decision on December 17 to refuse the integration summit with the EU—for the first time in 14 years.
In the medium-term perspective, the preservation of Serbia’s unchanged foreign policy course amid growing chauvinistic-autocratic sentiments and further weakening of pro-democratic forces will stimulate the PRC to transition to a “fortification” model of presence.
This is primarily about doubling investments in strategic infrastructure and, accordingly, systematic financing of loyal local elites. At the same time, Beijing will not object to Serbia’s accession to the European Union, viewing it as a potentially more manageable and stable autocratic proxy regime than the current Hungary.
In particular, from the Chinese perspective, the Serbian infrastructure network is capable of performing the function of a transit hub for Chinese goods—at least until trade between the EU and the PRC is destabilized by a full-scale war in the Indo-Pacific.
An important feature of China’s approach to Serbia is also the de facto legitimation of the revisionist agenda of the Serbian Progressive Party, which further builds political mobilization around the narrative of “historical injustice” and the idea of restoring Greater Serbia.
This discourse structurally correlates with the PRC’s expansive logic in the Indo-Pacific and can potentially be instrumentalized within a broader configuration before a possible invasion of Taiwan.
In particular, Xi Jinping does not rule out a scenario of synchronized destabilization, which would include a Serbian move against Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, potential escalation by the DPRK against South Korea, and renewal of a Russian offensive in Ukraine; these actions are seen as a way to defocus the US and weaken American-Japanese containment before the PLA’s action.
In the nearer perspective, Beijing is activating support for the separation of Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of its further integration into Serbia.
This intervention in favor of Belgrade acquires particular relevance amid Sarajevo’s decision to hold repeated early elections for the President of Republika Srpska on February 8, 2026, after the removal from power of affiliates of Milorad Dodik—a key partner of Xi Jinping, whose influence the White House is trying to intercept.
Such intentions explain Beijing’s rising interest in increasing the presence of Chinese military equipment in Serbia—under conditions where no Balkan state (except Greece) is in a mode of active militarization and objectively does not pose threats to Serbian national security.
As of 2026, Serbia is the only European state outside the Russian-post-Soviet network that systematically imports significant volumes of weapons from the PRC contrary to warnings from Brussels and Washington.
In particular, the issue of Chinese arms supplies to Serbia—as well as the joint exercises in Hebei Province—became a subject of discussion in the US House Foreign Affairs Committee.
According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the PRC accounts for 57% of the total volume of Serbia’s arms imports in 2020-2024, which significantly exceeds the indicators of the RF (20%) and France (7.4%). It is expected that this disproportion will further deepen.
Notably, Serbia became the first European state to purchase Chinese strike drones CH-92 and CH-95, as well as air defense systems FK-3 (HQ-22) and HQ-17AE (HQ-17).
This armament was presented on September 20, 2025, during the military parade for the Day of Serbian Unity, Freedom, and National Flag. At the same time, the financial parameters of the corresponding contracts were never officially disclosed.
From a pragmatic perspective, Belgrade’s such choice is due to the fact that Chinese air defense systems structurally rely on Soviet technological solutions, which ensures their technical compatibility with the existing Serbian arsenal of Russian origin.
In the unmanned systems segment, the emphasis was placed on technology transfer: cooperation with Chinese developers of CH-92 directly contributed to the creation of the Serbian drone “Pegaz,” presented in 2022.
In a broader context, this is about a model typical for the PRC of military-technical cooperation, similar to that implemented in Belarus within the program for producing MLRS “Polonez,” which are now being adapted as carriers of nuclear weapons.
In the context of overall military exports, the PRC views Serbia as a regional platform for selling defense products. Confirmation of this was its participation in the International Arms Fair in Belgrade at the end of 2023.
Within its framework, the Chinese CNPMIEC presented laser systems for countering low-altitude drones, ELINC—electronic warfare and drone countermeasures, Norinco—anti-tank systems and armored vehicles, and CATIC—the strike drone Wing Loong II.
Their unprecedented presence was aimed at entering the markets of states that avoid direct military-technical contacts with the PRC, RF, and Belarus, but allow indirect import channels.
The sharp increase in Chinese military-technical presence in Serbia reflects Beijing’s strategic need to retain a flagship proxy jurisdiction in Europe.
Against the backdrop of the potential loss of Hungary, weakening positions in Greece, and the revenge of pro-American forces in Slovakia, Serbia remains the PRC’s only stable Balkan asset capable of performing military-technical, logistics, and narrative proxy functions in Eastern Europe.
At the same time, the military-technical part of Chinese-Serbian interaction is acquiring an increasingly structural character. The focus on air defense systems, strike drones, and technology transfer forms a long-term dependence of Serbian armed forces on the Chinese military-industrial complex, which already significantly exceeds supplies from the RF and EU.
In parallel, Belgrade is transforming into a regional hub for the distribution of Chinese weapons to third countries that seek to avoid direct contracts with autocracies under US pressure. In this sense, Serbia is gradually taking on a role functionally similar to that performed for the PRC by Belarus and Georgia.
In a broader strategic dimension, the Serbian direction is increasingly clearly integrated into the global configuration of the PRC’s preparation for force scenarios in the Indo-Pacific.
The legitimation of Belgrade’s revisionist agenda, support for destabilization potential in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and targeted military saturation of Serbia provide Beijing with tools for controlled regional escalation capable of defocusing the US and its allies at a critical moment.
Accordingly, Serbia is viewed by Xi Jinping not as a peripheral partner, but as an element of multi-vector escalation that combines the Balkans, Ukraine, the Korean Peninsula, and the Taiwan Strait into a single operational framework.
The Donald Trump administration takes into account the noted negative trajectory—and initiates a new stage of correction of the Serbian conjuncture after the completion of the electoral cycle in Hungary.
