On December 7, 2025, the United States began preparations for the first-ever Tokyo meeting of the GCOT (Global Coalition on Telecommunications) coalition, also known as the “telecommunications group of the Five Eyes.”
Within its framework, government representatives from the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan are to coordinate new policy standards in the areas of 6G and AI, as well as conduct negotiations on cybersecurity, quantum technologies, and Open RAN.
Representatives of national technology companies responsible for implementing high-speed and secure internet will also join their work. The main goal of this year’s GCOT meeting, however, is defined as containing the PRC in the sector of advanced telecommunications technologies.
In parallel with this, the USA held an open conference in Tokyo, the International Open RAN Symposium 2025, with participation from representatives of 20 states, including Finland, Germany, Taiwan, India, and Brazil. It was also aimed at reducing Chinese presence in the telecommunications sphere, including in the so-called “Global South.”
The deployment of GCOT’s work in Japan is taking place against the backdrop of the final formation of the Trump administration’s approaches to key security coalitions in the Indo-Pacific, based on the transactional logic of “big deals.”
On the eve of this process, the United States announced the formal renewal of commitments within the AUKUS coalition, and also presented an updated National Security Strategy focused on preserving and strengthening coalitions capable of ensuring the implementation of the “strategic decoupling” policy from the PRC.
In parallel, Washington provides political support to the PIPIR coalition—a military-industrial and technological alliance of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific democracies aimed at gaining an advantage over autocracies in the areas of critical natural resources, microelectronics, and drones.
At the same time, Donald Trump’s administration outlines sectors in which the United States cannot achieve strategic advantage without broad interregional cooperation.
The first such direction is defined as shipbuilding—a sector in a state of systemic crisis due to a shortage of production capacities and technological solutions.
Currently, the White House is addressing this vulnerability by involving South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and the European Union.
The second direction is defined as the technological-telecommunications sphere, which, under conditions of total PRC dominance, requires consolidation of democratic countries’ capacities—both for structural replacement of Chinese products and for restoring advantage in innovations.
Similar to the AUKUS and PIPIR coalitions, GCOT, launched in 2023, became one of the flagship projects of the Joe Biden administration. Its main task is defined as promoting telecommunications innovations with the participation of the USA’s leading allies through three-level cooperation between governments, business, and academic circles.
Since then, GCOT has held two meetings in Barcelona, agreeing on six principles for implementing AI in the telecommunications industry. In addition, the coalition formed certification principles for Open RAN, calling on developers to increase the compatibility of pro-democratic telecommunications products.
Donald Trump’s administration decided to contribute to strengthening the GCOT coalition with a clear strategic calculation, viewing the telecommunications sphere as one of the key elements of the development of American national security after 2025.
From the USA’s perspective, the development of mobile communications is not just an indicator of technological progress, but a variable of the state’s defense capability.
The transition to 4G opened access to mass mobile internet and ensured the basic needs of security structures. The launch of 5G shifted the internet into the category of critical infrastructure, enabling the scaling of autonomous transport systems, robotic platforms, the internet of things, and high-precision defense solutions, including network-centric drones.
In contrast, 6G itself, expected by 2030, will become the largest telecommunications transformation since the advent of mobile communications.
Unlike 4G and 5G, which primarily support the operation of individual technological products—smartphones, cars, or robots—6G will create a continuous, highly available telecommunications continuum capable of ensuring the functioning of complex technological ecosystems: from “smart” cities and logistics clusters to fully integrated military facilities.
In particular, the expected 6G speed in the terabit per second range and latency at the microsecond level will open possibilities for real-time holographic communication, the internet of senses, full-fledged metaverses, and new generations of autonomous and swarm systems.
A key difference of 6G also lies in the architecture of its provision: the network will combine ground towers, high-altitude platform stations (HAPS), drone-relays, and constellations of low-Earth orbit satellites like Starlink.
This means that 6G will go far beyond the phenomenon of mobile communications, transforming into a multi-level hybrid infrastructure that operates simultaneously from the ground, air, and space.
At the same time, the development of 6G is impossible without the development of AI: artificial intelligence will become the basis for traffic management, frequency spectrum optimization, real-time decision-making, dynamic channel selection for transmission, and autonomous network recovery in case of critical failures.
Accordingly, this is about a key subject of global confrontation between democracies and autocracies, which view technological advantage as a prerequisite for victory in a possible military clash.
Donald Trump’s administration realizes that the full defense of the United States in the new strategic reality depends on the resilience of communications just as regular armed forces depend on logistics.
A reliable control channel ensures operational coordination; data from unmanned platforms forms the basis of modern combat decisions; and control over radio frequencies determines the security of military and civilian infrastructure, which is also critically tied to telecommunications systems.
Viewing the success of Starlink as a technological prototype of the future space layer of 6G, the White House seeks to lay the foundation for the USA’s long-term advantage in global telecommunications competition and simultaneously displace the PRC from regions that directly affect American national security.
In particular, the American government takes into account that the PRC officially implements the concept of “military-civil fusion” (Military-Civil Fusion), within which the development and external expansion of Chinese telecommunications technologies are integrated into the PLA’s strategic programs.
This block includes the formation of large low-Earth orbit satellite groupings as an alternative to Starlink (the “Guowang” project), the deployment of dual-use 5G/5.5G networks, as well as systematic integration of AI for building autonomous and resilient military communications.
In parallel, the PRC officially classifies telecommunications infrastructure as a separate theater of warfare, incorporating into military doctrines the possibility of rapid and destructive cyberattacks on civilian networks to paralyze critical state functions, disrupt mobilization processes, and weaken defense supply chains.
Taking into account that soon 6G will function as the “heart” of high-tech ecosystems—from city management to coordination of combat systems and space platforms—the issue of preventing Chinese influence on future telecommunications infrastructure has an existential character for Washington. Accordingly, the USA will continue to promote and multiply coalitions like GCOT.
Regarding the current stage of 6G development, the PRC holds leading positions, having defined this technology as one of the key priorities of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030).
Since 2022, Beijing has regularly announced breakthroughs in the 6G field—including the creation of new transmission modules and laboratory tests with data transmission speeds at 280-300 gigabits per second.
The culmination of this process was the announcement in July 2025 of the creation of a prototype electronic warfare tool based on 6G technologies.
A key role in forming the Chinese 6G ecosystem is played by Huawei, ZTE, and China Mobile—corporations that control a significant portion of the global telecommunications market and operate with subsidies for 6G development ranging from $10 to $20 billion annually. This is envisaged by the “military-civil fusion” policy.
From the American perspective, the speed of Chinese progress in 6G is explained by massive campaigns of collecting and stealing intellectual property.
Also in Washington, it is believed that the current level of development of Chinese 6G technologies is capable of threatening the operation of advanced USA solutions, including F-35 fighters (as in the case of electronic warfare).
A similar situation is observed in the 5G sector. As of 2025, Huawei Technologies holds 34% of the global 5G station market, guided by the “single supplier” concept—an approach that contradicts the American Open RAN concept.
Although the next positions are held by Ericsson with 26% and Nokia with 18%, Huawei continues to demonstrate tendencies toward dominance through active promotion in the “Global South” markets.
Such a configuration forces the USA, whose share in global telecommunications innovations is relatively modest, to direct its own and partner support toward strengthening the positions of Swedish and Finnish manufacturers in the 5G segment.
At the same time, the White House emphasizes cooperation with Japan—a key competitor to the PRC in 6G and a leading supplier of components for Ericsson and Nokia.
In particular, Donald Trump and Sanae Takaichi concluded a separate agreement on the development of AI and advanced telecommunications technologies, including 5G and 6G; it also covers issues of cooperation to gain strategic advantage over the PRC in the areas of medical and biotechnological supply chains, quantum technologies, nuclear fusion, and space.
Examples of such interaction between the USA and democracies of Northern Europe and East Asia are multi-level.
At the end of October 2025, the American Nvidia announced the acquisition of a stake in Nokia for $1 billion, which caused an 18% increase in the Finnish company’s stock value after a long period of stagnation related to the loss of positions in the smartphone market.
The deal was backed by the announcement of a strategic partnership in the directions of 5G and 6G: in particular, Nokia will adapt its telecommunications software to Nvidia’s advanced chips, ensuring their coordinated operation in the direction of AI progress.
Immediately after that, Nokia signed a contract with the Japanese SoftBank regarding the modernization and expansion of 4G and 5G radio access networks in Japan.
This project complements the existing memorandum between SoftBank and the South Korean Samsung Electronics on integrating developments in the 6G field.
Indicatively, Nvidia, Nokia, Ericsson, and SoftBank are founders of the AI-RAN coalition, which works on forming 6G standards based on AI. It also includes Microsoft, HP, LG, Vodafone, Toyota, and other leading technology companies from democratic states of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific.
Such accelerated cooperation between pro-democratic companies, backed by national government support, indicates the inevitable return of Donald Trump’s administration to the flagship concept of his first administration—systematic replacement of Chinese telecommunications infrastructure with alternatives (The Clean Network, Blue Dot Network) in third jurisdictions.
However, unlike the 2017-2020 period, the current policy will be based not on encouragement, but on coercive mechanisms and strict transactional conditions.
This means that governments that consciously continue to rely on Chinese telecommunications equipment may fall under intensified tariff and political pressure from the USA.
In a broader dimension, this will serve as part of the White House’s strategy to deliberately narrow the negotiation field for Xi Jinping ahead of meetings with Donald Trump scheduled for April and September 2026.
The acceleration of initiatives in the 6G field ultimately means that the USA is transitioning to a multi-level and systemic strategy of displacing the PRC from the advanced telecommunications sector.
Under such conditions, strengthening specialized “lattice” partnerships—GCOT, AUKUS, PIPIR, and broader platforms like AI-RAN—creates a new architecture of collective control over 5G and 6G, artificial intelligence, and satellite systems.
Accordingly, the Trump administration’s decision to raise the political stakes in GCOT demonstrates the formalization of telecommunications security as a key element of USA national security in the context of competition with the PRC, which has officially integrated 6G development into its military-civil doctrine.
At the same time, the PRC maintains technological leadership in 6G, including large-scale investments by Huawei, ZTE, and China Mobile, as well as demonstrating the ability to integrate new solutions into the military sphere, particularly in electronic warfare.
This forces the USA to bet on strengthening pro-democratic manufacturers—Nokia, Ericsson, Japanese and South Korean suppliers—and integrating them into joint innovation chains along with Nvidia, Microsoft, and SoftBank.
In parallel, Washington is forming mechanisms for coercive replacement of Chinese infrastructure in third countries, returning to the Clean Network concept in a stricter, transactional format.
Such an approach is aimed at limiting the PRC’s strategic maneuver ahead of key diplomatic contacts in 2026 and creating a new global configuration in which the future 6G architecture is formed by democratic states, not Beijing.
At the same time, the USA realizes that victory in the telecommunications race will determine both the course of a potential conflict and the key prerequisites for preventing it.
