At the end of January 2026, the wave of mass protests in the United States, directed against raids by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in American cities, reached its apex and became one of the key domestic political factors in the pre-election cycle ahead of the congressional elections in November 2026.
On January 30, 2026, opponents of deportation measures, including activist groups ANSWER and Code Pink, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Democratic Socialists of America, as well as student and trade union associations, organized a series of strikes and demonstrations under the name “ICE Out.”
In the second-largest city in the state of Oregon, Eugene, as well as in Los Angeles, mass events led to clashes between demonstrators and law enforcement, attacks by protesters on administrative buildings and correctional facilities.
The next stage of rising tension and political polarization within American society, which led to an escalation of violence in cities that traditionally support the Democratic Party, prompted the White House to adjust the rigidity of its migration policy.
Just two days after the murder of community activist Alex Pretty in Minneapolis, which occurred on January 24, 2026, the head of the anti-immigration operation “Metro Surge” in Minnesota, Gregory Bovino, a proponent of tough measures, was removed from management.
Tom Homan, the White House border policy coordinator who implemented the Republican administration’s migration strategy during Trump’s first term and enjoys the President’s personal trust, was appointed responsible for oversight of ICE and CBP actions.
The White House’s desire to de-escalate the political crisis in Minnesota and other Democrat-controlled states was also manifested in the suspension from duties of CBP employees involved in the murder of Alex Pretty, and in the intensification of dialogue between Donald Trump and local Democratic Party leaders.
On January 26, the US President held a phone conversation with Minnesota Governor and former Democratic vice-presidential nominee Tim Walz, as well as Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey.
A few days after the President’s dialogue with these officials, the Trump administration announced the withdrawal from Minnesota of about 25% of ICE agents previously deployed to the state, and Donald Trump agreed to ensure the investigation of Alex Pretty’s murder by Minnesota authorities.
Protests against immigrant deportations, which began after Trump’s second inauguration, turned into a comprehensive challenge to the country’s domestic political stability at the beginning of 2026.
At the same time, they became a test for party strategies ahead of the autumn 2026 elections, as maintaining governability amid the anti-migration campaign emerged as a prerequisite for retaining support from moderate voters and preventing the spread of violent practices in urban centers.
The high level of polarization in American society, the increase in crimes driven by ideological intolerance, and the complex of political crises that the US faced during the first year of the Republican term led to the need for substantial political concessions from both major US parties.
Further escalation of political violence increases the likelihood of transitioning from situational outbreaks of violence to a prolonged internal conflict with periodic exacerbations.
Both Democratic and Republican party elites take into account that the exit of public discourse beyond peaceful and regulated political dialogue has provoked forms of public resistance that increase threats to the controllability of the domestic political situation in the country.
Both parties have begun to adjust their public line. Republicans are reducing the radicalism of forceful practices in Democrat-controlled jurisdictions, while Democrats are increasingly opting for de-escalatory and procedural mechanisms of influence so as not to appear vulnerable amid public demand for migration regulation and the restoration of law and order ahead of the autumn elections.
Concessions from both parties are also driven by the risk of a gradual decline in domestic manageability in the United States.
Such a decline creates favorable conditions for U.S. adversaries in geopolitical confrontation, as the ability to maintain political stability at home is becoming one of the key factors shaping the persuasiveness of American positions in global competition with the axis of autocracies.
Signs that the White House is losing its monopoly on domestic stability would be perceived by autocracies as the opening of a “window of opportunity.”
This, in turn, would enhance the PRC’s ability to more actively influence the intensity, directions, and scale of further geopolitical competition by exploiting the limited capacity of the American government to contain domestic political crises.
The desire to prevent such risks prompts both parties, despite ideological differences, to the need to seek partial political consensus for maintaining the country’s domestic stability, and to make mutual concessions to prevent dysfunction of federal bodies.
Escalation of the crisis creates electoral losses for each side through association either with “chaos in the cities” or with “uncontrolled coercion by federal authorities.”
This is felt particularly acutely by the moderate part of the Democratic Party, which seeks to ease the tension of the protest wave and not cement the party’s image as a force that “leads” destabilization.
An additional incentive for restraint is the internal organizational fragmentation of the Democrats after their defeat in the 2024 presidential elections: the absence of leaders capable of uniting the party pushes individual factions toward situational separate actions, which only heightens the need for a consolidated position.
A practical signal of readiness for compromise from the Democrats was the support by nearly half of its Senate faction for a package of laws on funding state institutions for fiscal year 2026.
The approval of appropriations for most ministries by a group of Democratic senators made it possible to avoid a long-term shutdown and resume the work of the Departments of Defense, Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Housing and Urban Development four days after the expiration of their previous funding term.
This reduced the risk for Democrats of being portrayed by Republicans as initiators of institutional dysfunction amid rising violence in cities.
Given the Democrats’ unwillingness to support funding for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to which ICE and CBP are subordinate, the senators agreed to temporary funding for this department for a period of two weeks.
On February 13, 2026, the DHS funding term will expire, after which the Department will again face a partial suspension of several of its functions.
This deadline thus becomes an entry point into congressional negotiations, in which Democrats will seek to balance demands for transparency and accountability of ICE and CBP with the need to avoid escalating the conflict ahead of the autumn campaign.
Thus, during the shutdown that lasted in October-November 2025, about 13,000 DHS employees involved in internal research, planning, and auditing were sent on unpaid leave.
Critically important functions of the department will continue to be performed, as the law passed in 2025 called “One Big Beautiful Bill” provided DHS with about $165 billion, which is sufficient to ensure funding for ICE and CBP over the next several years.
However, despite such advantages for individual agencies within DHS, the performance of administrative and other support functions by the Department will be limited.
A prolonged conflict over funding for the department responsible for public safety in the US, cybersecurity of the country, and counterterrorism will be perceived by China and its allies as a sign of internal dysfunction in the United States at the moment of escalating confrontation with the axis of autocracies.
Realizing the risk that a number of security agencies will face in the event of uncoordinated DHS funding, the White House recognized the need for serious concessions to the Democrats, which the Trump administration has systematically made since the end of January 2026.
Donald Trump’s contacts with Minnesota leadership, the removal of proponents of forceful methods to combat protesters against White House migration policy, and the withdrawal of some immigration agents from Democrat-controlled megacities have all become elements of the Republican administration’s pre-election strategy.
This strategy is aimed at reducing public dissatisfaction with its policies ahead of the new Congress elections in November 2026.
According to averaged indicators from the RealClear Polling aggregator, the Republican approval rating has dropped to 40.5%, and 5.2% more citizens are ready to vote for Democratic Party candidates in the next Congress than for their Republican competitors.
A significant factor reducing electoral support for Republican candidates in the upcoming 2026 elections is the low level of public support for the presidential administration’s initiatives and actions.
As of February 6, 2026, Donald Trump’s overall job approval rating has dropped to 42.3%, becoming one of the lowest during his entire second term.
According to a CNN/SSRS poll published in January 2026, only 36% of respondents believe that White House policy focuses on the right priorities, which leads to a consistent decline in Donald Trump’s support among independent voters.
While in the first days of his presidency, 44% of voters who do not associate themselves with any political party approved of Trump’s performance as President, by January 2026 this figure had dropped to 29%.
Although the main reason for the deterioration of the President’s and his administration’s ratings remains socioeconomic problems in the US, dissatisfaction among American voters with migration policy becomes a catalyst for declining White House support.
According to the January 2026 AP-NORC poll, 61% of Americans do not support the Republican administration’s immigration measures, and 42% of voters, according to the CNN/SSRS study, believe that the situation with security and law and order in US cities has worsened during the first year of Trump’s term.
Critical attitudes of citizens toward the administration’s initiatives in the field of domestic security are additionally influenced by the unpopularity of most heads of law enforcement and security agencies.
Thus, back in July 2025, Pam Bondi’s approval rating as US Attorney General was 32%, while only 36% and 34% of respondents gave positive assessments to the work of FBI Director Kash Patel and his deputy Dan Bongino, respectively.
Regular cases of overreach by DHS subordinates have significantly deepened this dissatisfaction—in February 2026, 58% of voters emphasized the need to dismiss Department of Homeland Security head Kristi Noem, and 59% of Americans noted systemic problems in the work of ICE, which is subordinate to her department.
The growth of public outrage over ICE and CBP activities prompted the White House to implement more transparent rules of operation for employees of these agencies, which became part of the White House strategy to increase Republican support among moderate voters.
In particular, from the beginning of February 2025, the use of body cameras during ICE agents’ performance of their duties was made mandatory, which Democratic senators demanded during discussions of the bill on funding state institutions for fiscal year 2026.
Ultimately, the presidential administration’s concessions on security issues and the agreement of several Democratic senators to support appropriations for key federal departments became one of the consequences of the U.S. Department of Justice’s publication of a package of documents.
These materials described financier Jeffrey Epstein’s criminal activities and his personal connections with representatives of American political and financial elites.
The process of publishing Epstein-related materials has significantly increased the level of public distrust in the White House, and in particular citizens’ uncertainty that the American government will make available all important information related to the financier’s case.
According to a CNN poll conducted at the beginning of 2026, 49% of Americans did not consider the Trump administration’s activity sufficient regarding the disclosure of the “Epstein files,” and 67% were confident in the government’s interest in hiding part of the information.
The publication of the main array of documents related to Epstein’s activities on January 30, 2026, did not reduce the level of distrust among American voters toward the White House.
At the same time, it intensified the general rejection of political and financial elites due to the establishment’s long-term personal contacts with the financier.
The publication of most “Epstein documents” becomes the basis for additional radicalization of conflict in society, as the simultaneous growth of distrust in elites and experience of street confrontation expand the social base for anti-institutional actors and increase the risk of conserving low-intensity internal confrontation.
In parallel with public disillusionment in the American political establishment, the disclosure of documents related to Jeffrey Epstein contributes to deepening public polarization in the country.
Mutual accusations by politicians from different parties of connections with the financier and involvement in his illegal activities fuel conflict between Republican and Democratic supporters, and as a result lay the foundation for even greater political polarization in the US.
Since political trends in the US at the beginning of 2026 faced growing public outrage against the government, political violence, and deepening internal conflict in society, both Republican and Democratic leaders faced the need to find ways to de-escalate public tension in the country.
For moderate Democrats, the priority became reducing the degree of conflict through budgetary and oversight mechanisms, rather than attempting to lead the protest wave, so as not to reinforce the perception of the party as co-responsible for street destabilization and “softness” on migration.
To maintain political stability, the leadership of both parties demonstrated their readiness to seek compromise solutions in the security and budgetary spheres.
Such a strategy has become the only guarantee of domestic political stability and the main safeguard preserving the U.S. ability to respond effectively to external threats amid escalating confrontation between Washington and the axis of autocracies.
The absence of consolidated Democratic Party leadership and the growth of anti-institutional distrust will increase the likelihood of situational, tactical agreements with the White House instead of a stable long-term strategy of confrontation.
