From February 2 to 4, 2026, a delegation from the Taiwanese party Kuomintang (KMT) made its first official visit to the PRC in a decade. The formal reason for it was the KMT’s decision to resume institutional contacts with the Communist Party of China—particularly through their affiliated think tanks.
According to KMT Vice Chairman Hsiao Hsu-tsen, who led the delegation to Beijing, the talks covered issues of intensifying bilateral cooperation in industrial, digital, and youth spheres, as well as the idea of “promoting peace” between Taiwan and the PRC.
However, it is believed that the real objective of this visit was to lay the groundwork for direct negotiations between the new KMT leader Cheng Li-wun and Xi Jinping by the end of 2026.
Ultimately, following the visit, the KMT and the Communist Party of China issued a joint statement, according to which both sides categorically oppose Taiwan’s independence within the framework of the “1992 Consensus,” and insist that the Chinese and Taiwanese are “one people.”
The departure of Hsiao Hsu-tsen’s delegation to Beijing occurred shortly after the blocking of consideration of Taiwan’s special defense budget in the Legislative Yuan.
In particular, on January 30, 2026, the KMT and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) advanced an alternative bill for consideration by the relevant committee, which provides for reducing funding for the defense agreement between the US and Taiwan from $39 billion to $12 billion.
The key items for cuts were identified as components of air and unmanned defense, including the purchase of 200,000 drones and funding for the new multilayer air defense system T-Dome.
Despite the formal possibility of blocking the KMT and TPP initiative at the presidential level, the parliament’s unchanging position creates the risk of prolonged paralysis in Taiwan’s national security and defense sector.
The deterioration of the aforementioned domestic political dynamics, which finally crystallized after Chen Li-wun’s appointment as KMT chairwoman in late autumn 2025, reflects the evolution of the PRC’s approaches to subordinating Taiwan.
This involves Beijing’s transition to a strategy of building multilevel political superiority over the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the achievement of which will determine the future decision to launch a military campaign against Taiwan.
Beyond information-psychological operations aimed at ensuring KMT victory in the 2028 presidential and parliamentary elections, Xi Jinping is counting on paralyzing Taiwanese budgetary and administrative processes and deliberately fostering an image of societal division based on perceptions of the PRC.
Xi Jinping is aware that prolonged domestic political confrontation forces Taiwan’s allies to question Taipei’s readiness to independently ensure its own survival in confrontation with the PRC—and, accordingly, to rethink the necessity of providing security support.
The ultimate goal of this strategy is to form a global perception of Taiwan not as a “second Ukraine,” but as a “second Afghanistan”—that is, an object of geopolitics where investments in defense are politically and strategically unjustified.
Given that after the removal of Zhang Youxia—the architect of the Chinese invasion plan for Taiwan—from the Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping has become the sole figure authorized to decide whether to start a war.
This situation essentially narrows the PRC’s future actions to two options: either Beijing will try to subordinate Taiwan by supporting openly loyal and anti-American political groups, or it will launch an offensive campaign shortly after the 2028 elections.
In the short term, the growth of ties between the Communist Party of China and the KMT is a tool for the PRC’s preparation for negotiations between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, expected in spring 2026.
In particular, Beijing seeks to demonstrate to the White House that the US has “already lost” the struggle for control over the First Island Chain, since Taiwan—the central node of this system—is one step away from transferring power to the pro-Chinese Chen Li-wen.
Under this logic, the dispatch of the KMT chairwoman to Beijing should occur before Xi’s meeting with President Trump—particularly after the Lunar New Year (February 17).
In parallel, the KMT seeks to institutionally paralyze the activities of President William Lai’s administration in order to entrench among voters the narrative of the DPP’s managerial incompetence.
At the same time, while for some KMT factions such tactics are a situational tool for gaining power at the expense of national security (ahead of the autumn local elections), for groups close to Chen Li-wun, it means deliberate preparation for Taiwan’s political integration into the PRC under the “one country—two systems” formula.
The latter scenario will have the most negative consequences for US foreign policy interests, as—beyond the loss of an economic artery and industrial hub—it will involve reorienting the PLA toward forceful scenarios against Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and ultimately the US itself.
The Donald Trump administration recognizes the risk of such developments, including the White House’s inability to directly intervene in Taiwanese politics to weaken the KMT’s positions.
In this regard, it focuses on forming a more comprehensive strategy, oriented not so much toward declarative support for Taiwan or William Lai’s administration, but toward practically guaranteeing the irreversibility of Taipei’s course and structurally weakening the PRC.
Despite the absence of direct mentions of Taiwan in the new edition of the US defense strategy (2026 National Defense Strategy), the Donald Trump administration continues to view this jurisdiction as critically important for national security.
This was directly confirmed by Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Gelberg during the signing of a memorandum with Taiwan’s Minister of Economic Affairs Kung Ming-hsin regarding the implementation of the goals of Pax Silica—the flagship initiative of Donald Trump aimed at achieving technological superiority over the PRC.
In this same context, in mid-January 2026, the US and Taiwan agreed to finalize a “big deal.” It provides for reducing US tariffs on Taiwanese goods from 20% to 15%, which sharply contrasts with the existing 47% on goods from the PRC.
In response, Taiwanese semiconductor companies committed to investing at least $250 billion in the US within the framework of already existing agreements.
Such a deal format is politically and economically beneficial for President Lai, as it restores the competitiveness of Taiwanese manufacturers relative to Japanese and South Korean ones, which will directly impact the socioeconomic situation of the population.
At the same time, even if the KMT attempts to block ratification of the “big deal,” the preferential regime for Taiwanese technology giants will remain a key tool for White House support of the DPP.
In a scenario of parliamentary blackmail, the Donald Trump administration could deliberately pressure technology companies affiliated with the KMT and TPP, creating incentives for them to vote in their own interests.
Finally, the future Japanese government, formed based on the results of the snap parliamentary elections on February 8, could have a decisive influence on the dynamics of Taiwan’s domestic politics.
On January 27, 2026, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that the US-Japan defense alliance could collapse in the event of Tokyo’s inaction during a war around Taiwan; with this, she made it clear that Taiwan is the central element of the current strategic consensus between the US and Japan.
Given the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan’s (LDP) readiness for comprehensive buildup of the state’s defense and security capabilities, Tokyo is capable of using its own channels of interaction with the KMT and TPP to intercept influence over opportunistic political groups.
Such a scenario could reduce domestic political pressure on President Lai’s administration and facilitate the unblocking of defense agreements between Taiwan and the US.
As for the further actions of the DPP government, they will focus on institutionalizing and scaling the campaign to counter (pro-)Chinese agents, which was launched after William Lai took office as President. This was formally confirmed by the head of the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of Taiwan, David Hsu, at the beginning of 2026.
In autumn 2025, the Taipei District Court issued sentences to four persons affiliated with the DPP in a case of espionage on behalf of the PRC, providing for up to 10 years of imprisonment.
Among them are the first assistant to Joseph Wu, former Minister of Foreign Affairs (2018-2024) and current head of Taiwan’s National Security Council; the first deputy head of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy—a foundation that sponsors initiatives to support Taiwan’s independence; as well as an assistant to William Lai from his vice-presidency period.
According to Taiwan’s prosecutor’s office, these individuals “for a long time” maintained contact with an agent network directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, whose curator of the “Taiwan section” until recently was Zhang Youxia.
They transmitted to PRC intelligence detailed information about Taipei’s closed negotiations with representatives of the US, EU, Japan, and other democracies favorably disposed toward Taiwan, which significantly helped the PRC circumvent US containment.
Against this backdrop, in January 2026, the Kaohsiung city prosecutor’s office arrested a reporter from CTi News—a KMT media conglomerate known for anti-Americanism—on charges of subversive activities on behalf of the PRC.
He is accused of recruiting Taiwanese military personnel to record video appeals calling for switching to the PRC’s side in the event of war, as well as transmitting official secrets obtained from them. As part of this case, five military personnel from ground, naval, and air forces, as well as missile units and air defense forces, were detained.
Similar trends are observed directly in the defense sector. On January 30, 2026, Taiwan’s Supreme Court announced a final “11-year” sentence for a former air force colonel who, from 2019-2023, carried out recruitment of personnel and collected military secrets in the interests of the PLA.
In parallel, Taiwan’s High Court in Kaohsiung sentenced a former Coast Guard officer to seven years in prison, who from 2022-2024 transmitted military and state secrets to the PRC, including recording classified defense infrastructure objects and transmitting the content of encrypted correspondence for monetary reward.
Overall, according to Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, from 2020 to April 2025, charges were brought against 159 persons in espionage-related cases, of which 95 are active or retired military personnel (about 60%).
Among them are 46 officers, 27 sergeants, and 22 rank-and-file soldiers, indicating a systemic expansion of Chinese subversive influence.
In addition to Taiwan itself, recruitment was carried out in third jurisdictions (Indonesia, Singapore) during official trips or vacations. Payments for PLA services ranged from $10,000 to $50,000.
At the same time, according to the Taiwanese government’s position, the threat of Chinese espionage will continue to grow. In particular, Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice records an increase in attempts by Chinese intelligence to recruit citizens through Facebook, LinkedIn, and dating apps.
In addition, traditional platforms for subversive activities remain Chinese state networks, particularly WeChat. Given these security risks, Taiwan banned the Chinese online shopping app RedNote at the end of 2025, which had about 3 million Taiwanese users.
In parallel, Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs provided recommendations to refrain from using the TikTok and Weibo apps as posing significant security threats. In this same context, Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior warned of increasing risks of Chinese cyberattacks, with about 2.65 million detected per day.
Notably, in each case of imposing restrictions on Chinese apps, KMT leader Chen Li-wen declared the “establishment of censorship.”
These statements are accompanied by narratives that the United States is not interested in defending Taiwan and uses it solely to sell “obsolete weapons,” and that President Lai’s administration is provoking the PRC by purchasing arms from the US.
Chen separately emphasizes that Taiwan may face the “fate of Ukraine,” which, according to her claims, “provoked Russia through excessive rapprochement with NATO and the United States.”
Given that Chen Li-wen and her KMT faction are increasingly crossing US “red lines,” it is not excluded that President Lai’s administration may approve an investigation directly against her regarding Chinese espionage.
The totality of such processes indicates that PRC interference in Taiwan’s domestic politics has transitioned from the phase of targeted information-psychological operations to the phase of structural undermining of state capacity.
A key element of this process has been the transformation of the Kuomintang under Chen Li-wen into a tool of direct political, budgetary, and narrative pressure aimed at delegitimizing Taipei’s defense course and international partnerships.
The KMT delegation’s visit to Beijing, synchronized with the blocking of the defense budget and the public reproduction of pro-Chinese and anti-American theses, simultaneously reflects the PRC’s transition to an attempt at “political” capture of Taiwan by 2028.
This involves creating long-term paralysis of administrative and security mechanisms within the Taiwanese state, which is intended to undermine DPP support and bring Chen Li-wen victory in the presidential elections.
For Xi Jinping, such a strategy is optimal under conditions of increasing power concentration: it allows either to achieve Taiwan’s subordination without war or to move to a forceful scenario after 2028 under conditions of a weakened, politically divided, and internationally isolated Taipei.
The key consequence of the PRC’s implementation of plans for Taiwan’s “return” will be the destruction of the US containment system along the First Island Chain.
The Donald Trump administration—despite limited opportunities for direct influence on Taiwanese politics—takes these trends into account and keeps Taiwan in the focus of strategic planning.
In particular, it continues to provide the DPP with indirect support through geopolitical integration within the “big deal” and the Pax Silica alliance, and considers the possibility of increasing pressure on business affiliated with the KMT and TPP to neutralize the PRC’s subversive tactics.
Under such conditions, the period from 2026 to 2028 will become a decisive stage in the struggle for influence over Taiwan, which will be determined by Taipei’s ability to maintain state manageability, continuity of defense planning, and the trust of strategic partners.
If the KMT, with PRC assistance, is able to institutionalize parliamentary sabotage, delegitimize security cooperation with the US, and impose the narrative of Taiwan’s “internal incompetence,” Beijing will obtain conditions for subordinating the island without immediate use of force.
In the event of this scenario’s failure, the PRC will be forced to transition to the forceful option after the 2028 elections, if it is not halted by White House containment beforehand.
