At the end of the fall of 2025, the Donald Trump administration sharply accelerated the review of mechanisms aimed at banning the activities of Chinese technology companies in the USA.
In particular, leading civilian drone manufacturers DJI and Autel, the multi-profile Alibaba, the cloud giant Baidu, and the electric vehicle sector leader BYD have simultaneously come under potential restrictions in American jurisdiction.
Although the corresponding steps are being implemented by different institutions, they are united by a common implementation framework—from the end of December 2025 to the end of 2026.
Since taking office, Donald Trump has avoided large-scale restrictions on leading Chinese companies in the USA. He has also refrained from direct public accusations, focusing on structural negotiations with the PRC.
The basis of this approach was the need to make transactional adjustments in the global economic-political system and conclude a series of “great deals” with third jurisdictions necessary for implementing the policy of “strategic decoupling” between the USA and the PRC.
Under such conditions, potential bans on Chinese companies could become an element of the next phase of American containment of the PRC—and one of the key levers of pressure on Xi Jinping in 2026.
The foundation for such a development of events is a comprehensive set of geopolitical and security priorities of the White House.
First, the Donald Trump administration consistently views “strategic decoupling” from the PRC as the key foreign policy and economic goal of the USA for the period 2025-2035.
This means the current administration’s aspiration to completely eliminate from the American economic-industrial system any presence of the PRC that could affect national security or societal development.
This includes resource, infrastructure, technological, pharmaceutical, information, cultural, and other sectors in which the PRC’s presence became critical in the era of globalization (1991-2021).
Under such logic, the issue of restricting the activities of specific Chinese companies is resolved for Washington; at the same time, it retains space for step-by-step advancement in this direction within the framework of increasing pressure on Beijing.
Second, the White House expects that 2026-2027 will become “breakthrough” years for diversifying supply chains of technologies and critically important natural resources; this should be facilitated by “great deals” with the EU, Japan, South Korea, and most ASEAN states.
In particular, the Donald Trump administration plans a controlled and phased closure of vulnerable economic sectors to the PRC in order to stimulate the activities of American and partner companies under a protectionist principle.
At the same time, it realizes that the soft steps of the previous presidential team proved ineffective in areas where the PRC continues to hold a de facto monopoly position; this is especially evident in the case of DJI, which as of 2025 controls up to 80% of the American market—despite incentives from the Joe Biden administration to invest in alternatives.
Given that access to “cheap” drone technology is a matter of strategic military advantage, the White House will make tough decisions to achieve parity with the PRC by 2028.
Third, imposing restrictions on Chinese technology giants, which derive a significant portion of their profits precisely from the American market, is viewed by the Donald Trump administration as a tool for preparing for negotiations with Xi Jinping in April and September 2026.
In a broader dimension, this involves forming an additional lever of influence on Beijing in a situation where the USA and the PRC have reached a short-term agreement on fixing tariffs on Chinese goods at 47%.
Under such logic, the White House will apply targeted bans on the sale of products from Chinese technology companies (as well as uncertainty regarding these issues) to force Beijing into steps necessary for the USA—particularly in the sphere of regional military conflicts.
Under a similar scheme, the Donald Trump administration will restrict key Chinese marketplaces, which the PRC uses as one of the main tools to overcome the crisis of overproduction. An example of this approach is the process of transferring TikTok to an American ownership structure.
Finally, from the American perspective, bans on Chinese technology products will directly and indirectly affect the conjuncture of other democratic markets, which are already forced to adapt to the tariff “orchestration” of the Donald Trump administration.
In addition to the aspect of national security itself, pressure on third jurisdictions will also be applied to strengthen the positions of American competitors to the PRC—particularly Amazon, which is receiving increasing favor from President Trump after the escalation of his relations with Elon Musk.
Under such conditions, the prospect of restrictions on the activities of Chinese companies in the USA is viewed as a strategic necessity and a tactical tool that must be applied immediately after the establishment of Donald Trump’s tariff campaign.
At the same time, the White House’s intentions to apply new restrictions on Chinese companies are currently in the field of political-bureaucratic confrontation.
A particularly illustrative case in this regard is the procedure for banning DJI products in the USA. The current procedure for banning DJI in the USA is in its final stage.
On December 23, 2025, the one-year period established by a special law (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025) expires for conducting a mandatory audit that must answer the question of whether Chinese drone manufacturers, including DJI, pose a threat to U.S. national security.
Under the law, if none of the authorized agencies—the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the NSA, or the National Intelligence—complete the mentioned audit within the established period, the Federal Communications Commission will automatically add DJI to the Covered List of equipment and services that pose a threat to national security.
This step will essentially block the import of new DJI products into the USA. As a result, the company would face a de facto ban on selling new drones and related equipment on the American market.
Despite DJI publicly insisting on its willingness to undergo the audit and having repeatedly addressed the Donald Trump administration with a formal request to begin it, the responsible agencies are shifting responsibility onto each other, providing the White House with tactically advantageous uncertainty.
Simultaneously, a parallel initiative to ban DJI products is being considered in the U.S. Congress at the suggestion of Republican Elise Stefanik, who is close to Donald Trump’s team.
In particular, she seeks to achieve a ban on importing this company’s goods at the level of law, emphasizing that DJI drones can transmit data on topography, critical infrastructure, and movements of U.S. armed forces to PLA units.
In addition, she asserts that existing mechanisms for controlling Chinese imports do not ensure adequate protection of American national security, and the special audit that was supposed to provide answers regarding DJI products will not be completed by December 23, 2025.
Despite support for Congresswoman Stefanik’s position in the lower chamber, Republican senators have a different vision. In particular, Senators John Boozman and John Hoeven emphasize that DJI drones are key tools for supporting American national security in the sectors of agriculture, energy, emergency situations, and law enforcement.
Appealing to the interests of farmers and the National Sheriffs’ Association, they argue that previous restrictions on DJI have already led to operational failures of federal services, which were forced to replace drones with “expensive helicopters in risky operations.”
Ultimately, some Republican senators lean toward the positions of the Joe Biden administration, that banning DJI products without providing full American analogs will create an insurmountable threat to the functioning of U.S. critical infrastructure.
A similar thesis is supported by lobbying structures hired by DJI to promote its products at the state level; it is believed that the PRC has spent at least $3 million on them.
The Donald Trump administration realizes that an immediate ban on DJI products could cause undesirable instability in relations with Congress and with electorally important groups—primarily the agricultural sector and law enforcement agencies.
Therefore, the most likely scenario for its further actions is deferring tough restrictions following the model tested in the case of TikTok.
At the same time, the White House may use a short-term ban as a tool to stimulate pro-democratic alternatives to DJI, as well as an additional lever of pressure on the PRC, which continues to obstruct the American vision of “strategic decoupling” in the EU and the freezing of the war in Ukraine.
In a broader strategic dimension, displacing DJI and Autel from the American market is viewed as part of the USA’s preparation for a potential confrontation with autocratic regimes.
The White House proceeds from the fact that currently only five states in the world are advanced users of “cheap” military systems created based on DJI drones—the PRC, RF, DPRK, Iran, and Ukraine; moreover, all of them produce these platforms based on Chinese microelectronics.
That is why banning DJI products is viewed by Washington as a necessary step to eliminate a critical security vulnerability.
In addition to the track related to Chinese drones, the White House is considering the possibility of banning other companies from the PRC that are widely represented in the USA.
At least since mid-fall 2025, the Pentagon has been negotiating with Congress about adding to the list of “Chinese military companies” (list 1260H) such technology giants as Alibaba Group Holding, Baidu Inc., and BYD Co.
According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen Feinberg, these three companies, along with Eoptolink Technology, Hua Hong Semiconductor, RoboSense Technology, WuXi AppTec, and Zhongji Innolight, serve the interests of the PLA and should be designated as military.
Although list 1260H is declarative in nature and does not create legal consequences by itself, its update could become the basis for a specialized audit, as in the case of DJI.
This potentially creates a situation where the USA could ban their activities under a similar model. Since the list is updated once a year, the corresponding decision must be made by January 2026.
At the same time, in addition to the legal restrictions themselves in the USA, inclusion in list 1260H has tangible economic consequences. In particular, shares of Tencent Holdings Ltd. and Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd. experienced devaluation and sell-offs after the corresponding Pentagon decision.
Particularly threatening for the PRC is the prospect of a complete ban on the activities of Alibaba Group Holding, which has large-scale trade, financial, and media interests in the USA.
In November 2025, the White House concluded that Alibaba provided the PLA with technological support directed against U.S. national security.
This includes providing Beijing with capabilities for precise detection of strategic objects, as well as granting access to personal data of American citizens—including IP addresses and payment information.
Against this backdrop, the House Select Committee on the PRC called for delisting Alibaba from American stock exchanges—that is, forced removal of the company from exchange trading, depriving it of access to American capital.
Additionally, American congressmen advocated against allowing Alibaba to organize the 2028 Olympic Games in San Francisco, despite lobbying for this initiative by the IOC.
From a deeper perspective, the Donald Trump administration seeks to prevent the theft of American innovations in the field of AI and cloud technologies by Alibaba and Baidu, which are now trying to compete with OpenAI and Amazon.
Accordingly, imposing bans on their activities in American jurisdiction may occur in 2026 not so much for political reasons as for pragmatic ones.
Similar processes concern BYD—the Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer that holds about 70% of the global market share. Although American jurisdiction has significantly lower indicators of BYD presence than the EU and the United Kingdom, the White House is concerned that this Chinese company’s network could indirectly negatively impact U.S. national security.
In the spring of 2025, the Donald Trump administration published evidence that BYD is under the direct influence of PRC legislation regarding the mandatory transfer of data to state organs, including the Ministry of State Security and the PLA.
This creates the risk that any digital modules, software, or charging infrastructure of the company located in the USA could be used as hidden channels for information collection, surveillance, or remote intervention.
Additional concern is caused by the activities of BYD’s subsidiaries in the USA, which during 2024-2025 conducted large-scale rebranding under the RIDE Mobility brand in order to position themselves as a “local manufacturer.”
According to Congress estimates, this may be an attempt to gain access to federal public transportation funding programs in order to integrate Chinese espionage systems into American critical infrastructure.
Given the USA’s strategic need to narrow the space for the presence of Chinese electric vehicles in democratic markets, including BYD in list 1260H is viewed as a key tool for systemic containment of the PRC.
This step synchronizes with decisions by the United Kingdom and Israel to restrict access of Chinese electric vehicles to security facilities, forming a global trend toward de-Sinification of technology supply chains.
This trend is already manifesting in a series of consistent actions: from traditional U.S. restrictions against Huawei—to initiatives to ban TP-Link routers as potential vulnerable points in critical infrastructure.
The combination of these processes indicates that the prospect of “great bans” on Chinese technology companies is forming as an organic continuation of the “strategic decoupling” policy—the core of the Donald Trump administration’s foreign economic course.
Under such conditions, restrictions on the activities of DJI, Autel, Alibaba, Baidu, BYD, and other PRC technology companies are viewed by the White House as the next stage of weakening Beijing’s strategic positions—after the transformation of global tariff conjuncture in favor of the USA and the conclusion of “great deals” with an anti-Chinese element.
Accordingly, it is preparing to apply against them phased and mutually complementary tools—from specialized audits to inclusion in lists of military companies.
In the strategic dimension, bans on the activities of Chinese companies in American jurisdiction will become for the Donald Trump administration a key lever in forming the global architecture of PRC containment in 2026-2028.
Their implementation should ensure the preconditions for diversifying technology supply chains, strengthen the positions of American competitors to the PRC, and create additional maneuvering space for negotiations with Xi Jinping.
Ultimately, this will also affect global economic dynamics, which under U.S. pressure will be forced to accept rules determined in Washington.
